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THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT AGAINST BINARY IDENTITY 
COLIN POCHIE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Identification documents encompass our lives and follow us 
from birth to death. Birth certificates, driver’s licenses, social security 
cards, passports—all serve to confirm one’s identity.1 And to do so, each 
document bears necessary identifying information: name, date of birth, 
address, citizenship status, signature, and so on.2 Some also carry infor-
mation about our physical appearance and gender.3 Most states divide 
this latter designation between male and female.4 
Yet many people do not slot neatly into this identification bi-
nary. Gender is necessarily core to an individual’s identity—it shapes 
the way they interact with others and with the world around them.5 In 
turn, gender manifests as an expression of self-perception.6 It functions 
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 1  See, e.g., DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. PASSPORT APPLICATION 2 (Jun. 2016), https://travel.state 
.gov/content/dam/passports/forms-fees/ds11.pdf, (allowing use of documents like driver’s li-
censes and passports to establish identity); see also Alissa S. Kalinowski, Comment, Compelling 
Agency Action: A Novel Regulatory Avenue for Correcting the Birth Certificates of Transgender 
Citizens, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 961, 968 (2018) (“[P]eople also frequently use their birth certifi-
cates as a form of identity documentation. Individuals utilize their birth certificates to acquire 
employment, receive government pension or insurance benefits, and obtain a passport, driver’s 
license, and Social Security number.”). 
 2  See Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 747, 749 (2015) (asserting that 
identity can be presented through numerous factors like race and sex). 
 3  See 6 C.F.R. § 37.17(c) (2012) (requiring gender for REAL ID Act compliant driver’s li-
censes). 
 4  See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, HOW TRANS-FRIENDLY IS THE DRIVER’S 
LICENSE GENDER CHANGE POLICY IN YOUR STATE? (2020), https://transequality.org/sites/de-
fault/files/docs/resources/Drivers%20License%20Grades%20Jan%202020.pdf. 
 5  See JULIA T. WOOD, GENDERED LIVES: COMMUNICATION, GENDER, AND CULTURE 23–27 
(9th ed. 2011); see also Brian T. Ruocco, Comment, Our Antitotalitarian Constitution and the 
Right to Identity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 196 (2016) (observing that recorded legal gender helps 
structure an individual’s life and “affects how the individual navigates sex-segregated facilities, 
legal documentation, gendered expectations, and interactions with state and nonstate entities.”). 
 6  See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 146, 152–54 
(2007) (listing examples of how gender manifests as an expression of self-perception by listing 
ways women would describe themselves as “masculine” or “feminine”). 
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as a social construct, as well as expression of one’s perception of being 
a man, woman, or gender-nonconforming person.7 Gender is thus dis-
tinct from (although also informed by) sex, which is assigned at birth 
based in part on physically observable traits.8 Social construct even in-
fluences the assignment of sex; for example, doctors often choose inter-
sex individuals’ sex for them with invasive surgery.9 
Nonbinary, agender, and genderfluid people, meanwhile, do not 
fall into the male/female binary.10 Instead, much of nonbinary experi-
ence is defined either by rejecting binary expression or mixing signals—
everything from hair, clothing, speech, gait, and more—which collec-
tively align with neither singularly male nor singularly female expres-
sion.11 This contrasts with cisgender people, whose gender expression 
aligns with their sex assigned at birth; it also contrasts with some 
transgender people, who often adopt the expression most aligned with 
their gender identity.12 Both nonbinary and transgender people some-
times suffer from gender dysphoria as well, which is defined as a con-
tinuous incongruence between one’s “expressed/experienced gender 
and the gender others would assign” one.13 
For both nonbinary and transgender people too, rejection of gen-
der identity and repression of gender expression harms mental health 
and self-perception.14 While not present in all instances, this tension 
may involve significant psychological distress.15 Positive socialization 
and reinforcement of gender identity alleviates this harm.16 One exam-
                                                            
 7  Id. at 152–54 
 8  Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision between 
Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 278 n.74 (1999). 
 9  Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of 
“Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 3, 283–85 (1993). 
 10  See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, UNDERSTANDING NON-BINARY PEOPLE 1 
(2016), https://transequality.org//sites/default/files/docs/resources/Understanding-Non-Binary-
July-2016_1.pdf (defining nonbinary, agender, and genderfluid people). 
 11  Shelby Hanssen, Note, Beyond Male or Female: Using Nonbinary Gender Identity to Con-
front Outdated Notions of Sex and Gender in Law, 96 OR. L. REV. 283, 287 (2017); see YOSHINO, 
supra note 6, at 24 (observing that identity is constructed not just by status or by mere existence, 
but also by conduct). 
 12  See Transgender FAQ, GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/transgender/transfaq (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2020) (discussing transgender identity); see also Cisgender, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015). 
 13  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA 1 (2013). 
 14  See Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Transgender 
and Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AM. PSYCHOL. 832, 832 (2015). 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id. 
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ple is allowing individuals to use restrooms which align with their gen-
der identity.17 Another is government documentation that reflects a per-
son’s lived gender. According to a.t. Furuya, a nonbinary person who 
won a gender-change petition in 2017, “[w]henever I go to the bank or 
a bar or the airport, I get anxious about showing my I.D. . . . this order 
means I am not on my own anymore—my state recognizes me.”18 
Several jurisdictions allow modifications to one’s name and gen-
der on government identification.19 This option is helpful for 
transgender people and allows them to reinforce and live as their expe-
rienced gender.20 But what of nonbinary people? Several states and 
Washington, D.C. now offer a third gender option for government iden-
tification.21 Some cities like Chicago will also allow a third gender op-
tion on their municipal identification.22 But that leaves out most states, 
which still force nonbinary people to adhere to binary identification.23 If 
the First Amendment right not to speak is to mean anything, then state 
governments cannot force binary expression on nonbinary people.24 
Though others have argued for either abolishing binary gender 
identification or taking a contextual approach, this article addresses the 
individual rights of nonbinary people and advocates for third-gender 
identification options.25 Part I of this article thus examines the law of 
                                                            
 17  WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH 
OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 1, 68 (7th ed. 2012), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/amo_hub_content/Association140/files/Standards%20of%20Care% 
20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH%20(2)(1).pdf [hereinafter WPATH STANDARDS]; see Am. 
Psychological Ass’n, supra note 14, at 839. 
 18  CA Court Issues Nonbinary Gender Change to Transgender Law Center Client, 
TRANSGENDER L. CTR. (Feb. 10, 2017), https://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/13570. 
 19  See Identity Document Laws and Policies: Driver’s License, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT 
PROJECT (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-id-drivers-license.pdf. 
 20  See WPATH STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 32; see also Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra 
note 14, at 841. 
 21  NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 4; see Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, 
and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 897 n.7 (2019) (collecting laws). 
 22  CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE ch. 2-176 (2019); see Chicago Municipal ID Offers Third Gender 
Option, HOWARD BROWN HEALTH (Dec. 18, 2017), https://howardbrown.org/chicago-munici-
pal-id-offers-third-gender-option/; see also H.B. 3534, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019) (author-
izing the addition of a third gender identity option on identifications statewide). 
 23  See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 19. 
 24  See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that “where the State’s interest 
is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh 
an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”); C. 
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 31 (1989) (“Liberty must presumably 
include the opportunity for involvement in the choice of, or responsible acceptance and affir-
mation of, those elements of our world that are matters of human creation and that are important 
for a person’s self-definition and self-realization.”). 
 25  See Clarke, supra note 21, at 902 (arguing for “a contextual approach to debates over sex 
and gender regulation”); see also Ruocco, supra note 5, at 197–98 (arguing for abolition of 
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gender nonconformity and how courts have viewed gender norms as ex-
pressive.26 It also explores recent gender-change litigation for both 
transgender and nonbinary people.27 Part II reviews the jurisprudence 
supporting the right not to speak, the right to identity expression, and 
the doctrine of government speech.28 Part III in turn applies the right not 
to speak to nonbinary people and argues that compulsory binary identi-
fication constitutes compelled speech under the First Amendment.29 In 
conclusion, this article recommends that states introduce uniform third-
gender options on identification documents to vindicate the liberty in-
terests of nonbinary people. 
I. THE LAW OF GENDER NONCONFORMITY 
Gender reclassification schemes vary from state-to-state.30 
Many require some proof of surgery—phalloplasty or vaginoplasty.31 
Until January 1, 2019, New York State required a doctor’s letter certi-
fying that the applicant identified as transgender or was otherwise gen-
der-nonconforming.32 California does not.33 Some states, like Tennes-
see, outright forbid gender reclassification.34 Certain federal agencies 
like the State Department have similar requirements as well.35 
Sex itself is subject to its own constructs. Biological determin-
ists36 often insist that sex is determined by genitalia—the circumstance 
                                                            
gender markers); see also Anna James (AJ) Neuman Wipfler, Identity Crisis: The Limitations 
of Expanding Government Recognition of Gender Identity and the Possibility of Genderless 
Identity Documents, 39 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 491, 494–95 (2016) (same). 
 26  See infra Part I. 
 27  Id. 
 28  See infra Part II. 
 29  See infra Part III. 
 30  See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 736 (2008). 
 31  Id. at 736–37. 
 32  Brooke Sopelsa, Gender ‘X’: New York City to Add Third Gender Option to Birth Certifi-
cates, ABC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/gender-x-new-
york-city-add-third-gender-option-birth-n909021 (last updated Dec. 29, 2018). 
 33  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 103430 (2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_ 
displayText.xhtml?lawCode=HSC&division=102.&title=&part=1.&chapter=11.&article=7. 
 34  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-203(d) (2016). 
 35  Know Your Rights: Passports, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, http://www. 
transequality.org/know-your-rights/passports (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 36  Generally defined as those who “think that sex and gender are coextensive.” Mary Mikkola, 
Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/. 
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of possessing a penis or vagina.37 But intersex people exist.38 Indeed, 
somewhere between 0.05% and 1.7% of all people are born with a mix-
ture of sex characteristics.39 The very existence of intersex people re-
flects that sex—at least, if derived from physical characteristics—exists 
across a spectrum, instead of a binary.40 Yet doctors often decide an in-
tersex person’s genital form for them, even when there is no medical 
need to do so.41 
Determinists also point to secondary sex characteristics—like 
body hair and hormone levels—to determine sex.42 Hormone levels are 
alterable, however.43 Their attendant characteristics change with those 
levels as well; for example, certain cisgender women can grow beards 
depending on their hormonal makeup.44 Indeed, polycystic ovary syn-
drome causes hormonal imbalances that lead to that exact phenome-
non.45 Consider too those who take hormone supplements or inhibitors.46 
Hormone replacement therapy is common for both menopause and os-
teoporosis.47 Despite those deviations, these people still retain their gen-
der identity.48 
The argument comes to rest at the chromosomal level: boys have 
XY chromosomes, girls have XX chromosomes.49 This idea betrays a 
juvenile understanding of biology, however.50 Take men who suffer 
                                                            
 37  Id. 
 38  What is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF NORTH AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_inter-
sex (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
 39  Intersex 101, LAMBDA LEGAL (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/ 
20151026_intersex-101. 
 40  INTERSEX SOC’Y OF NORTH AM., supra note 38. 
 41  Paul D. Castillo, Ask Lambda Legal—What Does “Intersex” Mean?, LAMBDA LEGAL 
(Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20151110_ask-lambda-legal-intersex. 
 42  See Mikkola, supra note 36 (stating that social forces, not hormones, shape the perception 
of sex). 
 43  See Hormone Therapy: Is it Right for You?, MAYO CLINIC (Apr. 14, 2015), 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/menopause/in-depth/hormone-therapy/art-
20046372 (informing about various hormone treatments to treat menopausal symptoms). 
 44  Hirsutism, MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-condi-
tions/hirsutism/symptoms-causes/syc-20354935. 
 45  See Julie Mazziotta, Woman Decides to Let Her Beard Grow Freely after 26 Years of Shav-
ing: “I Was Ready”, PEOPLE: BODIES (Jun. 15, 2016), http://people.com/bodies/woman-decides-
to-let-her-beard-grow-freely-after-26-years-of-shaving/. 
 46  See Eric Berlin, Refocusing Your Identity in Menopause, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Jul. 21, 
2011), https://www.everydayhealth.com/menopause/refocusing-your-identity.aspx. 
 47  See Yvette Brazier, What You Need to Know about HRT, MED. NEWS TODAY (May 25, 
2017), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/181726.php. 
 48  See Berlin, supra note 46. 
 49  See Mikkola, supra note 36. 
 50  See How Common is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF NORTH AM., http://www.isna.org/faq/ 
frequency (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
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from Klinefelter syndrome—they may possess one or more extra X 
chromosomes and develop more feminine characteristics than other 
men.51 Women who suffer from congenital adrenal hyperplasia experi-
ence much the same—they develop masculine sexual characteristics, in-
cluding masculinized genitals.52 In all these cases, few would accuse 
them of belonging to a different sex.53 But it also shows the tension be-
tween the identity we derive and the moldable characteristics that iden-
tity is based upon.54 
As discussed above, gender is even more fraught.55 It draws not 
just from sex characteristics, but also from the value we ascribe to those 
characteristics.56 The identity that we create depends on the value that 
we place in those characteristics.57 Nonbinary people, then, construct 
identity in a way that transgresses traditional gender constructs.58 But 
that identity also mixes gender norms in ways that do not form a binary 
whole.59 
While little precedent on the status of nonbinary identity exists, 
a large body has accumulated on gender transgression and how it inter-
sects with dignity.60 Though dignity sounds in due process, it has a deep 
interplay with liberty and other First Amendment principles.61 To un-
derstand expressive rights in identity, it is therefore useful to look to 
dignity jurisprudence.62 
A. Cisgender Transgression, Transgender Identity, and Dignity 
One of the earliest examples of the intersection of gender non-
conformity and dignity is Bowers v. Hardwick.63 There, a gay man chal-
lenged a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy under which he had been 
                                                            
 51  See id. 
 52  MARGARET M. MCCARTHY, HANDBOOK OF NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 393–413 (2012). 
 53  See Kerstin Hagenfeldt, et al., Fertility and Pregnancy Outcome in Women with Congenital 
Adrenal Hyperplasia Due to 21-Hydroxylase Deficiency, 23 HUM. REPROD. 1607, 1612 (2008). 
 54  See Self Identity, DESTINY’S ODYSSEY, http://destinysodyssey.com/personal-develop-
ment/self-development-2/self-concepts-self-constructs/self-identity/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2020). 
 55   See WOOD, supra note 5, at 23–24; see also Ruocco, supra note 5, at 202 
 56  See WOOD, supra note 5, at 23–24; see also Ruocco, supra note 5, at 202. 
 57  See WOOD, supra note 5, at 23–24; see also Ruocco, supra note 5, at 202. 
 58  See Hanssen, supra note 11, at 285. 
 59  Id. 
 60  See infra Part I-A. 
 61  See BAKER, supra note 24, at 87–88. 
 62  See infra Part I-A. 
 63  See 478 U.S. 186, 187–89 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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charged.64 In some sense, that case involved how Hardwick constructed 
his identity as a gay man; sexual autonomy is an essential part of identity 
for many.65 Writing for the majority, Justice White characterized the 
case as demanding a right to sodomy.66 In doing so, he rejected the no-
tion that gay people had the same rights as heterosexual people.67 
That mischaracterization faced a reckoning in Lawrence v. 
Texas, which expressly overruled Bowers.68 Under similar facts, the 
Court held that the liberty interest of dignity protected the sexual rights 
of gay people.69 But what stands out is how the Court considered the 
concept of dignity.70 Essential to that right of dignity was the ability for 
adults to relate to one another and find acceptance.71 Thus, the state can-
not “define the meaning of . . . relationship[s] or . . . set [their] bounda-
ries . . . . adults may choose to enter upon this relationship . . . and still 
retain their dignity as free persons.”72 
That same articulation of dignity through self-determination 
found even more support in Obergefell v. Hodges.73 The Court there ex-
panded the right to include same-sex marriage.74 Citing First Amend-
ment precedent, the Court held that “these liberties extend to certain 
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including 
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”75 That the 
ability to establish relationships is core to autonomy and identity, then, 
is clear.76 One scholar observed too that equality for LGBT individuals 
                                                            
 64  Id. at 187–88. 
 65  See id. at 187–89. 
 66  Id. at 190. 
 67  Id. at 190–91. 
 68  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577. 
 69  Id. at 567. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597, 2599, 2608 (2015). 
 74  Id. at 2602. 
 75  Id. at 2597–98 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–86 (1965) to support 
discussion of dignity and its intersection with the First Amendment freedom of association. 
That itself was based on the right to identity drawn from W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 631–36 (1943)). 
 76  See Steven J. Heyman, A Struggle for Recognition: The Controversy over Religious Lib-
erty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2015) (stating 
“[a]s the whole line of cases from Romer through Obergefell makes clear, LGBT people should 
be free to form socially and legally recognized relationships on the same terms as heterosexuals 
can . . . [a]bove all, they have a right to live in accord with their own values and identities while 
being treated as full and equal human beings and citizens.”). 
POCHIE  
242 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 19:2 
may only come about “when society stop[s] conditioning our inclusion 
on assimilation to straight norms.”77 
The Court has gone as far as recognizing that dignity—and all 
its attendant self-determinative concerns—may come from state identi-
fication schemes.78 In Pavan v. Smith,79 it held that Arkansas could not 
exclude one of a child’s same-sex parents from that child’s birth certif-
icate.80 Because the state allowed non-biological heterosexual parents to 
be listed, it denied same-sex parents the same dignity of legal recogni-
tion by excluding them from birth certificates.81 Indeed, the Court 
acknowledged that the certificate imparted “legal recognition that is not 
available to unmarried parents,” thus rendering it “more than a mere 
marker of biological relationships . . . .”82 Though Terrah and Marisa 
Pavan would have been their child’s legal parents regardless of what the 
birth certificate said, state recognition of their identities and relationship 
was still essential to their dignity rights.83 
A full-throated recognition of transgender and nonbinary indi-
viduals’ dignity rights in the same context has only recently emerged.84 
The court in Gonzalez v. Nevares85 held that the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico violated transgender individuals’ privacy and autonomy by 
requiring their birth certificates to bear any struck-out information after 
legally changing their names or gender designations.86 Just as the Court 
in Pavan acknowledged that excluding identity-affirming information 
from a legal document violated autonomy and dignity, the Gonzalez 
court acknowledged that including identity-contradicting information 
does the same.87 Though resolved on privacy grounds, the decision 
shows how “speech and identity are often intimately linked” and how 
the former helps “construct queer identities and gender norms.”88 It 
should come as little surprise then that nonbinary individuals have 
pushed for similar recognition in recent years.89 
                                                            
 77  See YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 21. 
 78  See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id. at 2076–77. 
 81  Id. at 2078. 
 82  Id. at 2078–79. 
 83  See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2077–78. 
 84  See Gonzalez v. Nevares, 305 F. Supp. 3d 327 (D.P.R. 2018). 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. at 328, 333. 
 87  Compare Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078–79 with Gonzalez, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 333. 
 88  Scott Skinner-Thompson, The First Queer Right, 116 MICH. L. REV. 881, 901–02 (2018). 
 89  See infra Part I-B. 
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B. Nonbinary People and the Law 
Litigation over nonbinary identity is relatively new.90 In one re-
cent case, a.t. Furuya, a nonbinary individual, successfully argued for 
gender reclassification to nonbinary.91 Furuya argued that they had lived 
as a nonbinary person for over half their life, but still “regularly face[d] 
harassment and challenges because of the perceived incongruence be-
tween [their] gender nonconforming appearance and their stereotypi-
cally feminine name and female gender marker on their government-
issued identification documents.”92 In a given example, Furuya detailed 
how they had to explain their situation when conducting business at 
their bank because their identification did not reflect their appearance.93 
Furuya argued that the First Amendment protected them from 
binary identification and described the binary requirement as state-com-
pelled speech.94 At the core of this assertion was that Furuya’s construc-
tion of identity inherently rejected binary gender.95 To force them to ac-
cept it would be to violate the values that the First Amendment 
protects—it would compel them to speak.96 The court ultimately granted 
a.t.’s request without ruling on the merits of their First Amendment ar-
gument, however.97 Other courts faced with similar claims have fol-
lowed suit.98 
Dana Zzyym’s struggle against the State Department’s binary-
gender rules, meanwhile, has received significant attention over recent 
years.99 Yet the court in Zzyym v. Pompeo also resolved the dispute un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act and left Zzyym’s liberty claims 
unanswered.100 The Department there had denied Zzyym—an intersex 
                                                            
 90  See infra Part I-B. 
 91  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Change of Name and 
Gender at 2, In re a.t. Furuya, No. 37-2016-00044778-CU-PT-CTL (Cal. Dec. 20, 2016); see 
also CA Court Issues Nonbinary Gender Change to Transgender Law Center Client, 
TRANSGENDER L. CTR. (Feb. 10, 2017), https://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/13570. 
 92  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Change of Name and 
Gender, supra note 91, at 2. 
 93  Id. at 2–3. 
 94  Id. at 12. 
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  See Decree Changing Name and Gender, In re a.t. Furuya, No. 37-2016-00044778-CU-
PT-CTL (Cal. Feb. 10, 2017). 
 98  See, e.g., Zzyym v. Pompeo, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1248, 1261 (D. Colo. 2018). 
 99  See Reuters, U.S. Judge Rules for Colorado Intersex Veteran Denied Passport, NBC 
NEWS (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/u-s-judge-rules-colorado-
intersex-veteran-denied-passport-n911391. 
 100  341 F. Supp 3d at 1260–61. 
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person—a nonbinary designation on their passport, and instead insisted 
that they choose either a male or female designation.101 Because Zzyym 
refused, the Department denied their passport; at the time, Zzyym com-
mented that it was “a painful hypocrisy that, simply because I refused 
to lie about my gender on a government document, that the government 
would ignore who I am.”102 
The Department gave several justifications for the policy, each 
less successful than the last.103 As the court found, three justifications—
that the Department needs consistent sex data to ensure passport accu-
racy, to determine passport eligibility, and to verify a passport-holder’s 
identity—all boiled down to the same purported need to cross-check 
gender with other identity systems.104 The court rejected all three in part 
because the Department already had identity-verification procedures 
that either worked independent of sex data from states and other federal 
agencies or disregarded sex data entirely.105 What’s more, the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization—the same organization that origi-
nally recommended binary gender markers on passports—now recom-
mends nonbinary gender markers for passports.106 The Department’s 
other claim that there is no medical consensus recognizing a third sex 
also fell because its relied-upon medical authority does recognize non-
binary genders.107 
The Zzyym court also rejected an argument often raised against 
nonbinary identification markers: that the time and cost of implement-
ing a system to recognize a third gender classification would be unduly 
burdensome to state and federal agencies.108 According to the Depart-
ment, “it would take considerable time and resources for the Depart-
ment . . . to alter their systems to add a third sex designation.”109 It made 
no effort to calculate what those costs might be, choosing instead to rely 
on the suggestion of cost alone to carry its argument.110 While acknowl-
edging that some cost was necessarily implicated, the Court rejected this 
                                                            
 101  Id. at 1251–52. 
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last argument out of hand.111 Without reaching Zzyym’s liberty claims, 
the Court thus found that the Department violated the APA.112 
Without any examination of the expressive rights at stake, cases 
like Furuya’s and Zzyym’s leave space for the success of individual 
rights theories.113 Dignity plays a significant role as well and bolsters 
the already robust expressive rights of nonbinary people.114 As discussed 
below, the First Amendment values of autonomy and self-determination 
similarly protect against compelled gender expression.115 
II. THE LAW OF COMPELLED SPEECH 
The First Amendment prohibits the federal and state govern-
ments from “abridging the freedom of speech.”116 The values of auton-
omy, mutual recognition, and dignity are all enshrined within the First 
Amendment.117 As one scholar puts it, “respect for individual integrity 
and autonomy requires the recognition that a person has the right to use 
speech to develop herself.”118 Autonomy too, reinforces the “authentic-
ity” of self—it functions as a mechanism to construct identity.119 Said 
differently, “if there is a ‘right to be,’ there is a ‘right to say what one 
is.’”120 
A.  Autonomy, Self-Determination, and Expression 
The Lockean concept of self-determination is inherent in First 
Amendment values and protections.121 In the state of nature, all people 
can act as they wish within reason.122 Individualism necessarily exists in 
nature, but its existence also requires respect of that determination.123 
                                                            
 111  Id. at 1259. 
 112  Id. at 1260–61. 
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That autonomy in turn protects individuals from coercion—”a liberal 
state has no authority to coerce individuals to hold or express particular 
beliefs. Instead, all the state legitimately can do is to require individuals 
to act in a way that respects the rights of others.”124 
Expression is an essential part of self-determination as well; re-
gardless of whether it is for oneself or for others, expressive acts help 
one define oneself to oneself as well as within society.125 Every individ-
ual has veto power over how they use their bodies and minds—and, in 
turn, how they influence the world around them.126 The First Amend-
ment thus functions as an identity-producing mechanism free from gov-
ernment interference in most circumstances.127 Any individual’s con-
duct “expresses and further defines the actor’s identity and contributes 
to [their] self-realization.”128 
Societal norms, however, can work to discourage unfavored 
identities.129 Typically, these are enforced not through law but through 
verbal acts of disapproval, disassociation, and the like.130 Unlike gov-
ernmental interference, norms do not themselves interfere with individ-
ual rights.131 But the social pressure they produce influences those who 
make law and policy; problems then arise when the state chooses to en-
force those norms.132 Recognition by government and by society is 
therefore essential to identity and individual liberty—otherwise, the 
state may “attempt[] to define who a person is,” which “clearly disre-
spects individual autonomy.”133 
While the First Amendment does not tolerate governmental pro-
hibition of otherwise permissible expression, it does permit the govern-
ment to place conditions and other restrictions on that expression.134 
Time, place, and manner restrictions have long been recognized in law, 
for example.135 So too entry costs, taxes, and other barriers to entry.136 
Even when recognition and accommodation may cost the government—
and society, through taxes—extra resources, it may shift that cost onto 
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the recognized.137 Thus, instead of forbidding certain identities, the gov-
ernment and unfavored groups may compromise by cost-shifting as a 
price of recognition.138 
Similarly, efficiency justifications may not work to abridge un-
favored expression.139 They subvert autonomy by presuming a desired 
end goal that preempts recognition and by defining efficiency relative 
to that goal.140 Efficiency, therefore, must follow liberty and not precede 
it; it is relevant only when the state already treats groups as autonomous, 
moral beings deserving of equal respect and mutual recognition.141 
These values underpin the First Amendment’s protection of dissident 
identities and inform compelled-speech jurisprudence. 
B. The First Amendment as an Identity-Producing Mechanism 
The seminal compelled speech case is West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette.142 There, the Court held that the state board of 
education violated the First Amendment by requiring students to salute 
the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.143 The salute was violative 
enough by itself—as a discrete expression, it “comp[elled] students to 
declare a belief.”144 The Court held that First Amendment protection 
“does not depend upon whether [government-mandated expression] be 
good, bad or merely innocuous.”145 
Significant too was that the challengers in that case were Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses.146 Their challenge rested in part on their belief that the 
Bible forbids holding graven images—in this case, the flag—above 
God.147 That belief functions as a core tenet of both faith and identity for 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.148 The Board thus could not require either “un-
willing conver[sion]” or “assent by words without belief and by [] ges-
ture barren of meaning.”149 And though the Court decided the broader 
                                                            
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. 
 139  BAKER, supra note 24, at 84. 
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question of whether any individual could be required to salute the flag, 
the underlying principle remains the same: “[N]o official, high or petty, 
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, 
or other matters of opinion . . .”150 Whether patriotism or faith, these 
beliefs contribute to how individuals perceive themselves and exercise 
autonomy over who they are.151 
The Court later reaffirmed this principle in stronger terms in 
Wooley v. Maynard.152 The Maynards, also Jehovah’s Witnesses, in-
sisted on covering the New Hampshire state motto “Live Free or Die” 
on their license plate.153 They claimed that the motto was “repugnant to 
their moral, religious, and political beliefs” and that the state thus vio-
lated the First Amendment by requiring them to use the plate.154 The 
Court agreed.155 In doing so, it rejected the state’s arguments that the 
motto was needed to identify that someone had New Hampshire plates, 
especially given that the numbers on the plate itself did exactly that.156 
This case reinforces the concept that “[t]he right to speak and the right 
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader 
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”157 
This same principle holds true for direct expressions of iden-
tity.158 The Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisex-
ual Group of Boston faced this question in the context of the 1993 Bos-
ton Saint Patrick’s Day Parade.159 Parade organizers there denied 
members of GLIB—an Irish LGBT advocacy group—permission to 
march in the parade.160 Recognizing that “[p]arades are . . . a form of 
expression,” the Court held that compelling GLIB’s involvement would 
functionally alter the parade’s message.161 This decision in part rested 
on the parade organizers’ silence as for non-heterosexual elements of 
Irish identity.162 To make the parade organizers include LGBT marchers 
                                                            
 150  Id. at 642. 
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in a decidedly heterosexual expression of Irish identity would violate 
their right not to speak under the First Amendment.163 
Government can compel speech in certain limited circum-
stances, however.164 Take Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institu-
tional Rights, Inc. for example.165 The Court there held that conditioning 
federal funding to law schools on allowing military recruiters on campus 
did not violate the First Amendment.166 FAIR, an association of law 
schools, sought an injunction against the condition because they op-
posed the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.167 But as for 
speech, the Court found “that there was little likelihood that the views 
of [the military] would be identified with the [law schools], who re-
mained free to disassociate [themselves] from those views . . .”168 Unlike 
the parade in Hurley, the Court found that the mere act of allowing 
speakers access to facilities is not itself expressive.169 
Autonomy and self-realization necessarily require another ele-
ment: recognition.170 Mutual recognition “requires a concern for peo-
ple’s liberty . . . for restrictions on liberty disrespect a person’s auton-
omy as a moral agent.”171 In turn, rejection of one’s identity counters the 
autonomy principles central to First Amendment freedoms.172 Accord-
ing to one scholar, groups have “no authority to act in ways that deny a 
person’s equality or . . . autonomy.”173 This concept necessarily has lim-
its, of course.174 After all, if one’s identity is based on denying the iden-
tity of another, that expression is illegitimate.175 Nor does it reflect First 
Amendment values.176 
This concept, according to some scholars, is rooted in Hegelian 
principles of confrontation and compromise.177 When the identity of two 
groups conflicts, the only solution that vindicates First Amendment 
value is for the groups to recognize one another as “free and independent 
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being[s].”178 This in turn reinforces the rule of reason that underpins 
Locke’s view of autonomy.179 Thus, “[w]ithin the state and the legal or-
der that it establishes, everyone has a basic duty to respect the person-
hood and rights of others,” even if it means compromising away certain 
facets of one’s identity.180 
The case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission reflects this tension between recognition and iden-
tity conditioned on the destruction of another’s identity.181 The groups 
confronting one another there were members of the Christian faith who 
did not want to serve LGBT individuals because the latter’s existence 
conflicts with their faith and religious identity.182 But the concept of mu-
tual recognition requires compromise—that a person “recognize that it 
is legitimate for another to embrace a particular identity and way of life, 
but only insofar as that identity and way of life are consistent with recog-
nition of the basic status and rights of all persons.”183 That the pivotal 
factor in the Court’s decision was a human rights commissioner’s neg-
ative comments about Christian history reflects this concept too.184 
Mutual recognition explains the outcome in Hurley as well.185 
The Court’s decision in part vindicates the autonomy of the parade or-
ganizers, but also asks GLIB to recognize the legitimacy of how the or-
ganizers constructed their identity.186 Unlike in Masterpiece, GLIB’s ex-
clusion did not deny its members’ identities—they were free to hold 
their own parade in celebration of their identities.187 In Masterpiece, on 
the other hand, one group would deprive the other of access to public 
accommodations to a degree that threatens their existence.188 
C. Government Speech 
The Court has held before that “[w]hen government speaks, it is 
not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of 
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what it says.”189 This is in part because the marketplace of ideas neces-
sarily requires government input in a democratic society—it is essential 
to an informed public.190 Without some protection for government state-
ments, the government itself could not function.191 Government speech 
is thus essential for the government’s “protecting and enhancing demo-
cratic values . . . improving its leadership capacity; [] enforcing its pub-
lic policies; and, in the end, [] securing its ability to survive.”192 Courts, 
however, have yet to acknowledge hybrid governmental/private speech 
and have instead defaulted to an all-or-nothing approach.193 
The case of Walker v. Texas Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc. demonstrates the problem.194 There, the Sons of Confederate Veter-
ans—a private nonprofit group that espouses the cause of the American 
Confederacy—proposed a specialty Texas license plate design featuring 
the Confederate battle flag.195 The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles 
denied the license-plate proposal outright; it did the same for the group’s 
second identical proposal after a comment period yielded overwhelm-
ingly negative public commentary.196 After the second denial, the Sons 
of Confederate Veterans sued the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles 
and alleged that the denial violated the group’s First Amendment 
rights.197 
The Court held that the license plates were government 
speech.198 So how does this square with Wooley?199 For one, the govern-
ment in Walker did not try to make the group speak a message it disa-
greed with; instead, it denied the group from making the government 
espouse a message with which it did not agree.200 The government had 
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a legitimate reason in denying the message too, as it stated “that a sig-
nificant portion of the public associate the confederate flag with organ-
izations advocating expressions of hate directed toward people or 
groups that is demeaning to those people or groups.”201 
The different outcomes in Sons of Confederate Veterans and 
Wooley is also explained by mutual recognition values.202 The Maynards 
in Wooley rejected speech foisted upon them by the state because it did 
not comport with their identity.203 Yet doing so did little to threaten the 
government’s existence or the identity of those who subscribed to the 
values of the state motto.204 In contrast, the identity asserted by the Sons 
of Confederate Veterans was one that implicated violence and hate to-
wards other groups.205 Its existence was based in part on rejecting the 
legitimacy of other identities and denying their autonomy.206 
Even when government speaks, though, it doesn’t always speak 
in its capacity as sovereign.207 When an expression is a hybrid of gov-
ernmental and private speech, the government’s interests do not always 
override those of the private speaker.208 That was the case in Lehman v. 
City of Shaker Heights.209 There, the city contracted with a private com-
pany to sell advertising space on its behalf on the Shaker Heights Rapid 
Transit System.210 Despite the city’s maintenance of the advertising 
space, the Court still held that it did not speak through the advertise-
ments.211 Instead, because it managed the advertising program to raise 
revenue, the city did not act as sovereign—it acted as a business man-
ager.212 Thus, it could exclude political advertisements that might 
threaten the image of its business.213 
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There are still reasonable limits on this relationship, however.214 
Self-determinative interest cannot undo the government—the protection 
of the First Amendment does not extend that far.215 That was the case in 
Bowen v. Roy when a Native American couple objected to the assign-
ment of a Social Security number to their daughter.216 The couple be-
lieved that spiritual purity required full autonomy, with no government 
interference whatsoever.217 But the Court denied this theory; as Chief 
Justice Burger wrote, “[t]he [First Amendment] simply cannot be un-
derstood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs 
in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.”218 
As discussed above, autonomy values do not prevent all government 
interaction with identity—only that which would deny identity com-
pletely.219 
When government maintains some form of identification—
whether license plates, driver’s licenses, or advertisements—part of that 
role is devoted to raising revenue.220 True, certain identification is used 
for internal administrative purposes.221 But so too are license plates, as 
seen in Sons of Confederate Veterans and Wooley.222 The essential in-
teraction is that the government acts as an administrator or manager that 
facilitates speech in some way.223 And when that identification is used 
to express facets of identity, the government has even less power to dic-
tate what form that must take.224 
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III. THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT AGAINST BINARY IDENTITY 
The First Amendment does not demand adherence to the gender 
binary.225 The rights to dignity, autonomy, and mutual recognition en-
shrined in its protections demand the opposite.226 If nonbinary individu-
als are to reify their identity, they must have access to the same govern-
ment privileges that cisgender and transgender people do.227 States in 
turn must recognize that they cannot compel nonbinary people to iden-
tify with identities that they do not adopt.228 Any accommodation for 
nonbinary identity on government identification will also likely be of 
little burden to the government, given cases like Wooley and Sons of 
Confederate Veterans.229 And even if it is, those administrative costs can 
be shifted to license holders like with vanity license programs.230 
Courts have repeatedly recognized that the First Amendment is 
a mechanism for constructing identity.231 Every person has a right to 
assert identity positively as well as to be free from being told who they 
are or who they must be.232 The oft-cited proposition of West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette is that “[N]o official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion.”233 This reflects the well-established principles 
of Lockean autonomy—the First Amendment guarantees self-determi-
nation within reasonable limits.234 Compelled speech, on the other hand, 
violates self-expressive autonomy in many cases.235 
Nonbinary people exemplify that valuation of autonomy.236 
Nonbinary identity itself is an amalgam of gender norms, falling into 
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neither male nor female categorization.237 To force a nonbinary person 
into either categorization is to ascribe an identity to them that they re-
ject.238 The flip side is that nonbinary identity itself is a positive expres-
sion of identity—one that adheres to no single gender stereotype, but 
which spans the normative spectrum to construct the self.239 For a person 
to self-determine their nonbinary identity also requires a nuanced un-
derstanding of gender norms and how society constructs and values gen-
der.240 Like the different Irish groups in Hurley, it requires differentiat-
ing between different permutations of identity.241 The government can 
no more demand that the Maynards display “Live Free or Die” on their 
license plate than it can demand that nonbinary people assume binary 
gender identity.242 
That right to self-determination is essential to living with dignity 
and equality with others.243 As the Court demonstrated in cases like 
Lawrence and Obergefell, continued repression infringes on the ability 
of individuals to associate with one another and to establish their iden-
tity.244 Repression may be forced through identification regimes like that 
in Pavan; yet the Court there acknowledged that dignity lies in state 
recognition—even through identification schemes.245 And while “[t]he 
majority would prefer to avoid the expressive activities’ predicted ef-
fects on people’s personality and behavior . . .” as in Bowers and Row-
land, that paternalist approach must give way to individual rights.246 
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Meanwhile, some might argue that passports, driver’s licenses, 
and the like are government speech.247 After all, the government creates 
them and assigns them to people.248 And it uses these documents for its 
own internal administration.249 But as in Lehman, the government acts 
as an administrator or business manager in issuing identification docu-
ments.250 True, it may use these documents for law enforcement pur-
poses.251 Though as in Wooley, the value of identification is just as im-
portant to the document-holder as it is to the government—handing 
someone a driver’s license is an expressive act of communicating iden-
tity.252 In this respect, the government is just as much an administrator 
of a revenue-generating identification program as it is a law enforce-
ment entity.253 
There is also little danger that providing nonbinary markers on 
documentation would be mistaken for a sponsorship of that identity.254 
As in Rumsfeld, the government “remain[s] free to disassociate [itself] 
from those views.”255 In the case of the federal government, it is also 
odd to think of that being a concern when the State Department already 
allows binary gender changes on passports, thus acknowledging the 
shifting nature of gender.256 Regardless, a third-gender marker would be 
much like a private ad on public property; as in Lehman, any question 
of attribution is dispelled by the government’s role as business manager 
instead of sovereign.257 
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Naturally, there are practical limits to what nonbinary individu-
als can demand.258 As in Bowen, nonbinary individuals can’t demand 
that any and every permutation of gender non-conforming identity be 
accommodated.259 To do otherwise would violate the understanding that 
the First Amendment does not “require the Government to conduct its 
own internal affairs in ways that comport with the . . . beliefs of partic-
ular citizens.”260 On the other hand, the government may avoid violating 
individual liberty by shifting costs onto license-holders.261 
Thus, as in the case of vanity license plates, there is little reason 
why the government cannot charge additional fees for specialty identi-
fication.262 Whatever the cost of altering how identification documents 
are printed or administering identity checks, that may be placed on the 
document holder.263 And if applicants are the ones paying for it, there is 
little immediate cost to the government besides time input. There is also 
no parallel justification for denying the identification as there was in 
Sons of Confederate Veterans.264 Unlike in that case, there is no threat 
of violence or identity deprivation if nonbinary people elect a third gen-
der on their identification.265 Though this sort of tax on identity is dis-
tasteful, it is not altogether different from the same premiums that van-
ity-license-plate owners bear.266 
Because binary-gender schemes violate a fundamental right, 
they should be subject to strict scrutiny.267 On the other hand, some 
scholars have suggested that hybrid government/private speech calls for 
intermediate scrutiny.268 Regardless of which level courts employ, bi-
nary-gender schemes likely do not pass any level of scrutiny.269 As dis-
cussed above, efficiency interests cannot override individual autonomy, 
especially when cost-shifting is available to offset time and resource 
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drain.270 Advancing a particular policy goal is also not a strong enough 
interest to pass either level of scrutiny when no alternative avenue of 
nonbinary expression exists.271 States must therefore recognize nonbi-
nary individuals or risk litigation losses. 
In contrast to a recognition model based upon individual rights, 
some call for the abolition of government-enforced gender identifica-
tion; this may be the best route in the long-term.272 Admittedly, there are 
inherent problems with any identification regime.273 The limits of a 
third-gender option will not necessarily accommodate all gender per-
mutations in the same way that vanity license plate programs accommo-
date identity.274 And by enabling recognition, third-gender identification 
may make it easier for nonbinary people to be targeted for harassment 
and discrimination.275 
But for all that, there is value in seeking third-gender identifica-
tion if only as a stopgap measure.276 For one, it will affirm and reinforce 
the identity of at least some nonbinary individuals; indeed, it seems un-
likely that a.t. Furuya and Dana Zzyym would have sought recognition 
if they did not value it in some way.277 Many transgender people also 
oppose abolition given the self-actualization benefits of the current 
identification regime.278 Identity reinforcement may also alleviate asso-
ciated distress and heightened rates of self-harm for those who suffer 
from dysphoria.279 
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Legal recognition is also one step toward accommodation and 
integration.280 Like abolition, recognition obviates the need to explain 
the difference between one’s appearance and the designation on one’s 
license.281 Though a third-gender option may lead to unintended outing 
for some, it may also eliminate conflict from identification incongru-
ence.282 On the other hand, integration is not necessarily a good thing; 
freedom from Western conceptions of gender and the liberal state is val-
uable in its own right.283 
But nonbinary people should regardless be recognized as auton-
omous individuals who can choose for themselves whether to support a 
third-gender identification scheme.284 It gives them the ability to set the 
terms by which others will recognize them.285 It grants them “. . . per-
sonal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including in-
timate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”286 And it allows 
them to compromise their identity with others in mutual recognition of 
shared dignity and autonomy.287 These are the freedoms that the First 
Amendment guarantees.288 
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CONCLUSION 
To this day, only a few states offer any sort of gender-noncon-
forming option for identity documentation.289 Yet Germany,290 Aus-
tralia,291 New Zealand,292 India,293 Nepal294 and other countries besides 
all provide exactly that. So why does the United States lag behind? And 
if this is the direction that the rest of the world is starting to head in, 
would it not be prudent to follow their lead—especially when the State 
Department argues that it needs uniformity to better process pass-
ports?295 
Perhaps full abolition of gender markers is the best route.296 Or 
maybe a context-based approach would work better.297 But for now, 
governments can take an immediate step that will start the path to both 
legal and societal recognition of nonbinary people.298 What is repressed 
under the current regime is nonbinary individuals’ “autonomy . . . the 
freedom to elaborate their authentic selves—rather than . . . a rigid no-
tion of what constitutes an authentic . . . identity.”299 The First Amend-
ment no more tolerates government-mandated religion than it does gov-
ernment-mandated gender.300 States should thus provide nonbinary 
people access to a third-gender option in government identification 
schemes. 
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